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Beyond Protest:
Proposal-Style Citizens’ Movements in 1970s and 80s Japan
Simon Andrew Avenell
1.  Introduction
From	the	mid	1970s,	the	language	and	strategy	of	Japanese	citizens’	movements	began	to	change.	
Rejecting	what	they	viewed	as	the	inadequate	logic	of	protest	in	earlier	social	movements,	citizen	activists	
conceptualized,	articulated,	and	implemented	a	new	proposal-style	(teian-gata)	of	activism.	Rather	than	
accuse	the	state	and	corporate	Japan	of	exploitation	or	environmental	destruction,	activists	encouraged	
citizens	 to	 channel	 their	 energies	 into	 the	 creation	 of	 self-sustaining	 alternatives	working	within	 the	
system,	in	the	process,	laying	a	foundation	for	less	idealistic	and	more	efficacious	social	activism.	Instead	
of	tackling	power	head-on,	activists	suggested	that	movements	get	behind	the	wall	of	domination	and	use	
the	tools	of	the	system	to	change	the	system—what	one	activist	graphically	conceptualized	as	“giving	up	
on	ideological	masturbation”	and	“going	to	bed	with	capitalism.”1	To	give	focus	to	their	novel	approach,	
activists	 in	 the	 mid	 1980s	 coined	 the	 term	 “proposal-style	 citizens’	 movement”	 (teian-gata shimin 
undō),	contrasting	this	with	earlier	“accusation-style”	(kokuhatsu-gata)	movements.2	Though	ultimately	
replaced	in	the	1990s	by	the	language	of	“civil	society,”	“NGOs”	and	“NPOs,”	the	idea	of	proposal-style	
activism	was	important	because	it	succinctly	articulated	activists’	single-minded	attempt	to	transform	the	
prevailing	language	and	strategy	of	social	movements.	But	more	than	this,	the	idea	of	proposal	became	a	
kind	of	blueprint	for	activism	in	later	decades	promising,	as	it	did,	success	through	the	hazardous	tactics	
of	engagement	and	symbiosis.	
The	 shift	 in	 language	 and	 strategy	 poses	 some	 intriguing	 questions	 for	 the	 historian	 of	 social	
movements,	 particularly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Japanese	 history	 after	 the	 student	 upheavals	 of	 the	 late	
1960s.	What	was	the	nature	of	social	movement	change?	Why	was	change	perceived	as	necessary?	Who	
effected	the	change?	And,	to	what	extent	did	the	change	involve	substantial	divergence	from	over	two	
decades	of	earlier	citizen	activism?	Herein,	I	put	forward	some	initial	answers	to	these	questions	through	
investigation	of	an	organic	produce	distribution	movement	at	the	center	of	the	proposal	generation,	the	
Association	to	Preserve	the	Earth	(Daichi o Mamoru Kai;	hereafter	Daichi).	I	show	how	activists’	ideas	
and	their	articulation	in	written	forms	of	communication,	such	as	movement	pamphlets	and	articles	in	
the	mainstream	media,	were	central	in	conceptualizing	the	language	and	strategy	of	social	movements	
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3	 My	 approach	 to	 ideology	 and	 its	 influence	 on	 social	movement	mobilization	 and	 development	 has	 been	 greatly	
enriched	by	 a	 growing	body	of	 sociological	 literature	 on	 framing	processes.	 Specifically:	David	A.	 Snow	and	Robert	
D.	Benford.	“Framing	Processes	and	Social	Movements:	An	Overview	and	Assessment.”	In	Annual Review of Sociology,	
vol.	26	(2000),	pp.	611–639;	David	A.	Snow	et	al.	“Frame	Alignment	Processes,	Micromobilization,	and	Movement	
Participation.”	In	American Sociological Review,	vol.51,	no.4	(August	1986),	pp.	464–481;	and	Ron	Eyerman	and	Andrew	
Jamison.	Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach	(University	Park,	PA:	The	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	1991).	
4	 Other	than	studies	on	regional	anti-pollution	or	anti-development	movements,	there	is	a	dearth	of	Japanese	language	
scholarship	synthetically	tracing	the	development	of	citizens’	movements	from	the	1970s	through	to	the	emergence	of	
the	NPO	sector	after	the	enactment	of	the	NPO	Law	in	1998.	Some	Japanese	activists	I	interviewed	speak	of	the	1970s	
and	1980s	as	the	“citizen	movement	ice	age”	(shimin undō fuyu no jidai).
5	 The	 professionalization	 of	 Japan’s	 social	 movement	 sector	 from	 the	 1970s	 mirrors	 a	 similar	 process	 in	 the	 US	
theorized	upon	by	Zald	and	others	under	the	rubric	of	resource	mobilization.	Mayer	N.	Zald	and	John	D.	McCarthy.	
Social Movements in an Organizational Society	(New	Brunswick,	NJ:	Transaction,	1987).
in	 the	wake	 of	 a	 decade	 of	 “accusation”	 and	 “protest.”	 Socio-economic	 change,	 conservative	 political	
institutions,	and	earlier	citizen	activism	all	played	a	role	in	facilitating	the	new	movements,	but	it	was	
leaders’	ideas	that	most	directly	stimulated	the	transition	to	proposal-style	grassroots	activism.3	From	a	
broader	historical	perspective,	this	paper	reveals	how	the	proposal	generation	forms	a	crucial	link	between	
the	citizen	and	resident	protests	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	and	the	NPO/NGO	activism	so	conspicuous	
in	recent	years.4	By	nurturing	activists	and	legitimizing	a	pragmatic	approach	to	social	activism,	citizens’	
movements	of	 the	70s	 and	80s	became	prototypes	 for	 Japan’s	non-profit	 organizations	 in	 the	1990s.	
Indeed,	citizen	activism,	I	argue,	did	not	disappear	after	the	residential	movements	of	the	1970s,	only	to	
miraculously	reappear	two	decades	later	in	the	form	of	professional	civil	society	organizations.	Instead,	
it	charted	a	course	that	lead	away	from	protest	in	the	direction	of	less	antagonistic	and,	arguably,	more	
effective	social	movements.
The	key	to	bringing	about	substantive	change,	activists	argued,	was	a	civil	 society	comprised	of	
effective—that	is,	results-producing—social	movement	organizations	(SMOs),	manifest,	for	example,	in	
the	“citizen	enterprise”	(shimin jigyō)	model	adopted	by	key	movements.	Herein,	SMOs	were	conceived	
of	as	profitable	(or	at	 the	very	 least,	 financially	self-sustaining)	 independent	entities	pursuing	realistic	
and	realizable	agendas	such	as	recycling,	peace,	nuclear	power,	organic	food	distribution,	and	support	for	
the	disabled.	The	leading	lights	in	the	creation	of	model	citizen	enterprises	were	Daichi	(organic	food,	
1974)	and	the	Japan	Recycling	Movement	Citizens’	Association	(recycling,	1977),	while	the	Dandelion	
House	Foundation	(Tanpopo no Ie; support	for	the	disabled,	1973),	the	Peace	Boat	initiative	of	Tsujimoto	
Kiyomi,	the	activism	of	self-described	“citizen	scientist”	Takagi	Jinzaburō,	and	other	similar	movements,	
extended	 the	 proposal	 model	 into	 other	 areas	 not	 so	 easily	 “commercialized.”	 The	 following	 table	
provides	a	breakdown	of	issues	for	movements	that	proactively	associated	with	the	discourse	and	praxis	of	
proposal-style	activism.5	Note	how	broad	systemic	issues	relating	to	“democracy”	or	“rights”	now	took	a	
backseat	to	specific	material	issues	rooted	in	everyday	life.	Here	the	proposal	generation	followed	a	trend	
already	emerging	among	the	myriad	of	local	residents	movements	from	the	late	1960s.	But	different	to	
these,	1970s	and	80s	activists	made	intentional	efforts	to	avoid	the	strategy	of	protest.
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6	 This	data	is	drawn	from	a	list	of	1309	citizens’	movements	compiled	in	Banana	Bōto	Jikkō	Iinkai,	ed.	Inochi, shizen, 
kurashi: Banana bōto—Mōhitotsu no seikatsu o tsukuru nettowākāzu no funade	(Tokyo:	Hon	no	Ki,	1986),	pp.	162–226.
7	 Ui	Jun,	for	example,	suggests	that	pragmatism	was	a	common	feature	among	resident	protest	movements	in	the	late	
60s	and	early	70s.	Ui	Jun.	Kōgai genron: Gappon	(Tokyo:	Aki	Shobō,	1990),	p.	10.
8	 Oda	Makoto.	Nani o watashitachi wa hajimeteiru no ka	(Tokyo:	San’ichi	Shobō,	1970),	p.	88.
As	 important	 as	 the	 new	 array	 of	 issues,	 however,	 was	 the	 overtly	 pragmatic	 approach	 these	
movements	adopted	toward	internal	organization,	and	also	toward	conservative	political,	economic,	and	
legal	institutions.	Within	movements,	activists	argued	that	citizens	need	not	cling	to	amateurism,	and	
that	professionalism	was	 the	one	 realistic	path	 to	 the	autonomy	so	 idealized	by	earlier	generations	of	
activists.	Similarly,	this	pragmatism	carried	over	into	activists’	approach	to	the	outside	world.	Reacting	
to	and	learning	from	what	they	perceived	as	the	fatally-flawed	praxis	of	protest,	activists	began	to	assert	
that	change	could	only	happen	if	movements	adopted	a	realistic	approach	to	institutional	power.	Kyōsei,	
or	symbiosis,	became	the	symbolic	expression	of	this	approach.	If	movements	wanted	to	succeed,	they	
would	 simply	 have	 to	 tap	 into—or,	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 learn	 to	 live	with—the	 power	 concentrated	 in	
bureaucracies,	political	parties,	and	corporate	Japan,	regardless	of	ideological	colors.	In	short,	any	ally	was	
a	good	ally,	and	any	resource	potentially	useful.
To	an	extent	this	pragmatism	was	nothing	new.	Citizen	activists,	from	at	least	the	1950s,	displayed	
a	pragmatic	impulse	both	ideologically	and	in	the	realm	of	nuts-and-bolts	activism.7	But	in	the	hands	of	
1970s	activists,	this	impulse	took	on	specific	connotations.	It	implied	that	citizens’	movements	would	
be	far	better	off	if	they	abandoned	rigid	idealism	or	fruitless	protest	and	focused	on	changing	the	things	
they	could.	Devotion	to	principles	was	certainly	admirable,	but	in	the	end	what	really	mattered	was	the	
condition	of	the	ordinary	individual	in	everyday	life.	The	system	needed	to	be	changed,	no	doubt.	But	
change,	activists	argued,	had	to	begin	at	home	in	the	“small	universes”	of	daily	life—what	the	intellectual	
and	activist	Tsurumi	Shunsuke	some	decades	earlier	had	called	a	bugs-eye,	as	opposed	to	a	birds-eye,	
approach	to	social	activism.8
As	it	turned	out,	pragmatism	was	an	important	choice	since	it	would	have	historical	repercussions	
A List of Issues for 1300 Citizens’ Movements in 1986 6
300
289
249
162
153
132
125
108
98
87
81
63
59
Natural soap
Collective purchasing 
Environment and conservation 
Village and town revitalization 
Agriculture
Energy (including anti-nuclear activism)
School lunches
Pollution
Consumer issues
Safe milk
Food
Education
Peace
58
56
55
49
48
39
37
37
33
15
15
9
13
Medical
Politics (local and national)
Information networks
Recycling
Anti-smoking
Fruit and vegetable stores
Welfare
Women
Assistance to developing nations
Freedom of information
Okinawan issues
Cultural / performance
Other
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9	 Alberto	Melucci.	“A	Strange	Kind	of	Newness:	What’s	‘New’	in	New	Social	Movements?”	In	Enrique	Larana	et	al.,	
eds.	New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity	(Philadelphia:	Temple	University	Press,	1994),	p.	102.
well	beyond	the	movements	at	the	center	of	the	proposal	generation.	On	a	practical	level,	such	movements	
certainly	opened	a	window	to	the	professionalization	of	civil	 society	and	the	 legitimization	of	certain	
kinds	of	citizen	activism,	but	in	the	realm	of	ideology	and	public	discourse,	the	appeal	and	subsequent	
spread	of	pragmatic	social	activism	served	to	narrow	further	a	discursive	field	already	wounded	by	the	
popular	backlash	against	violent	and	 ideological	 social	movements	 in	the	 late	1960s	and	early	1970s.	
To	use	Alberto	Melucci’s	words,	 proposal	movements	 “broadcast”	 a	 new	 “message”	 to	 society,	which	
reconfigured	 the	 obligatory	 association	 of	 protest	 with	 social	 movements	 and	 the	 seemingly	 natural	
antagonism	between	capitalism	and	progressive	causes.9	The	 impact	of	 these	 two	developments—one	
strategic,	the	other	ideological—on	Japanese	democracy	and	civil	society	is	still	playing	itself	out	today.
2.  The Background to Proposal-Style Citizens’ Movements
Underlying	the	emergence	of	proposal-style	movements	were	a	cluster	of	environmental,	economic,	
and	 social	 transformations	 in	 Japan	 during	 the	 1970s,	 all	 of	 which	 filtered	 into	 activists’	 pragmatic	
ideology	and	strategy.	The	environmental	crisis	from	the	late	1960s	was	certainly	a	key	factor,	but	so	too	
were	the	value-transforming	impact	of	affluence,	the	legacies	of	earlier	social	movements,	and	the	impact	
of	new	ideas	on	grassroots	networking	imported	from	abroad.	These	factors	shaped	the	environment	in	
which	activists	formulated	their	new	pragmatic	ideology	by	providing	a	recipe	of	strategies,	a	listening	
audience,	and	a	bank	of	learning.
The Environmental Crisis:	The	environmental	crisis	of	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	was	a	crucial	
facilitating	factor	in	the	emergence	of	proposal-style	movements.	After	a	“miraculous”	decade	of	sustained	
high	economic	growth	during	the	1960s,	Japan	was	one	of	the	most	polluted	nations	in	the	industrialized	
world	with	inordinate	emission	rates	for	toxic	gases	such	as	nitrous	oxide.	The	country’s	rivers	and	bays	
became	dumping	grounds	for	industrial	waste	which,	as	in	the	infamous	case	of	Minamata	Bay,	reentered	
the	food	chain	reeking	havoc	on	the	ecosystem	and	surrounding	human	communities.	In	fact,	by	1973	
there	were	 some	3,000	 local	 residents’	movements	protesting	 against	 environmental	pollution	 in	one	
form	or	another.	By	1970,	pollution	had	reached	such	proportions	that	it	became	a	national	political	
issue.	Late	in	that	year	the	ruling	Liberal	Democratic	Party	(LDP)	was	left	with	no	choice	but	to	pass	
some	of	the	most	stringent	anti-pollution	laws	in	the	industrialized	world	in	what	was	to	become	known	
as	the	“Pollution	Diet.”	Fourteen	pieces	of	legislation	submitted	for	debate	were	enacted	into	law	with	
some	modification.	The	 legislation	 covered	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 pollution	 issues	 including	 roads,	 waste	
management,	pesticides,	sewage,	national	parks,	and	even	noise	levels.	
The	 mass	 media	 also	 chimed	 in	 to	 the	 new	 concern	 with	 pollution.	 The	 number	 of	 articles	
mentioning	“pollution”	(kōgai)	in	the	Asahi shinbun	 increased	dramatically	from	84	in	1965	to	2,506	
by	1970.10	Reflecting	the	rising	public	concern,	from	1974	through	1975,	the	same	newspaper	ran	an	
influential	serialized	novella	by	the	author	Ariyoshi	Sawako,	titled	Fukugō osen	(Complex	Pollution).	This	
personal	account	by	Ariyoshi	set	out	in	graphic	and	minute	detail	the	structure	and	logic	of	environmental	
pollution	 in	 Japan.	But	most	 importantly,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 it	 turned	 the	 spotlight	on	consumers	 as	
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10	 Articles	in	the	Asahi shinbun	mentioning	pollution	by	year:
My	thanks	to	Chikako	Miyamoto	of	International	Christian	University	for	extracting	this	data	from	the	Asahi shinbun 
CD	article	database.
11	 Ariyoshi	Sawako.	Fukugō osen	(Tokyo:	Shinchōsha,	1979).
12	 Trends	in	the	nationwide	surveys	on	the	Japanese	national	character	provide	supporting	evidence	for	changing	values	
with	respect	to	Nature.	Respondents	were	given	three	choices	with	respect	to	the	relationship	between	man	and	nature:	
in	order	to	be	happy	man	must	(1)	follow	nature;	(2)	make	use	of	nature;	(3)	conquer	nature.	In	1968,	on	the	eve	of	the	
environmental	crisis,	response	percentages	were	19%,	40%,	and	34%	respectively,	but	by	1973	they	had	shifted	to	31%,	
45%	and	17%	respectively.	In	other	words,	there	was	still	strong	support	for	the	idea	that	nature	should	be	utilized,	but	
less	support	for	the	idea	it	should	be	conquered	and	more	support	for	the	idea	it	should	be	followed.	If	we	trace	these	
figures	through	to	1998,	we	find	that	now	49%	believed	nature	should	be	followed,	39%	believed	it	should	be	utilized,	
and	only	9%	believed	it	should	be	conquered.
Adapted	from	Research	Committee	on	the	Study	of	the	Japanese	National	Character.	A Study of the Japanese National 
Character: The Tenth Nationwide Survey	(Tokyo:	Institute	of	Statistical	Mathematics,	March	1999),	p.	51.
complicit	“aggressors”	(kagaisha)	in	the	pollution	problem,	opening	the	way	for	self-examination	and,	
later,	individual	action.11	Many	in	the	proposal	generation	cite	Ariyoshi’s	novel	as	important	not	only	in	
awakening	them	to	their	complicity	in	the	pollution	problem	but,	more	significantly,	in	opening	their	
eyes	to	the	kinds	of	realistic	solutions	ordinary	citizens	could	propose.	In	this	sense,	Ariyoshi’s	work	was	
significant	because	it	opened	a	new	discursive	space	previously	dominated	by	the	logic	of	accusation	and	
protest.
Coupled	 with	 this	 attention	 in	 political	 and	 media	 circles,	 the	 proposal	 generation	 benefited	
greatly	 from	 less	 overt,	 though	 nonetheless	 significant,	 socio-economic	 transformations	 underway	 in	
1970s	 Japan.	 Affluence	 clearly	 facilitated	 new	 concerns	 with	 respect	 to	 health	 and	 the	 environment	
in	 mainstream	 consciousness—concerns	 which	 activists	 skillfully	 incorporated	 into	 their	 message	 of	
proposal.	Moreover,	Japan’s	high-growth	economy,	which	on	the	one	hand	liberated	middle-class	women	
from	the	household	and	on	the	other	virtually	excluded	them	from	the	full-time	workforce	after	marriage,	
quite	inadvertently	created	a	mobile,	highly	educated,	and	socially-attuned	constituency	toward	which	
proposal	activists	could	direct	their	message.12
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13	 Interview	with	Fujita	Kazuyoshi,	3	April	2002.
Thus,	 by	 the	 mid	 1970s,	 public	 consciousness	 vis-à-vis	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	 economic	
development	was	extremely	high	as	a	result	of,	first,	protest	movements	which	exposed	rampant	pollution,	
second,	 government	 legislation	 to	 alleviate	 this,	 and	 third,	 exponential	 attention	 in	 the	media.	This	
national	awakening,	together	with	socio-economic	changes	afforded	by	affluence,	provided	a	favorable	
opportunity	for	activists	who	could	come	up	with	practical	solutions	or	alternatives	to	the	prevailing	logic	
of	“violent”	industrial	development.	
Social Movement Legacies: The	 pragmatic	 strategy	 of	 activists	 stemmed	 in	 large	 part	 from	 their	
visceral	reaction	to	the	movements	of	the	1960s.	Activists	learned	first	hand	the	limits	of	social	activism,	
and	 by	 consequence,	 the	 kind	 of	 strategies	 likely	 to	 end	 in	 failure.	The	 radicalization	 and	 ultimate	
suppression	of	the	student	movement	was	key	because	many	in	the	proposal	generation	either	cut	their	
activist	 teeth	 during	 this	 period,	 or	 witnessed	 its	 unfolding	 in	 the	 national	media.	 Activists	 such	 as	
Fujita	Kazuyoshi	and	Fujimoto	Toshio,	who	established	Daichi	in	1974,	joined	the	ranks	of	the	student	
movement	 from	 the	 latter	half	of	 the	1960s	when	university	upheavals	 reached	 their	peak.	As	Fujita	
later	recalled,	infighting	among	student	groups	and	the	turn	in	public	opinion	against	students	after	the	
violent	clash	with	police	at	Tokyo	University	in	1969,	forced	him	to	rethink	the	very	notion	of	social	
activism.	That	 he	 and	other	 radicals	 such	 as	Fujimoto	 ended	up	with	 jail	 terms	 only	 reinforced	 this	
feeling.	“I	learned	the	limits	of	accusation	and	protest	in	a	visceral	way,”	Fujita	remembers.13	Indeed,	the	
message	was	clear:	the	structure	of	conservative	rule	was	almost	impenetrable	through	frontal	assault—
particularly	when	supported	by	constituencies	anesthetized	by	the	spoils	of	growing	affluence.	Activists	
who	could	shed	their	radical	skin	and	adapt	to	the	conservative	environment	survived	and	their	ideas	
came	to	dominate	the	social	movement	sector,	while	those	who	could	not	disappeared	along	with	their	
message.	This	was	the	reality	imparted	by	the	1960s.
Many	 activists	 also	 cite	 their	 visceral	 reaction	 to	 the	 postwar	 consumer	movement	 as	 a	 source	
of	motivation.	 Fujita	Kazuyoshi	 of	Daichi	 felt	 that	 the	 consumer	movement’s	 carte	 blanche	 support	
for	 consumer	 issues	 blinded	 it	 to	 the	 wider	 socio-economic	 structure	 of	mass	 production	 and	mass	
consumption.	In	his	interpretation,	the	consumer	movement	was	ultimately	about	cheaper	prices,	and	
in	this	sense,	really	just	another	player	in	the	market	system.	Its	failure	to	engage	with	producers—to	
see	their	problems,	to	empathize	with	their	plight—made	the	movement	into	just	one	more	“aggressor.”	
As	Takami	Yūichi	of	 the	 Japan	Recycling	Movement	Citizens	Association	pointed	out,	proposal-style	
citizens’	movements	were	almost	an	“inevitable”	reaction	to	such	movements:	“[W]hen	I	looked	at	the	
failure	of	the	student	movement	and	the	accusation-style	of	the	consumer	movement,	I	thought	to	myself	
‘this	is	wrong’,”	Takami	explains.	“One	reason	for	the	decline	of	the	consumer	movement	was	its	failure	
to	make	any	proposals	to	society.	I	really	dislike	the	term	consumer	movement.	People	don’t	live	in	the	
world	to	merely	‘extinguish’	and	‘use	up.’	I	believe	the	next	movement—the	next	stage	of	our	engagement	
with	society—will	emerge	through	the	very	denial	of	the	notion	of	‘consumer.’	In	that	sense,	I	really	want	
95
Beyond	Protest
14	 “Extinguish”	and	“use	up”	are	the	two	characters	for	the	Japanese	compound	meaning	“consume”	(shōhi).	Instead	of	
shōhisha	(consumer)	many	in	this	generation	and	after	prefer	to	use	seikatsusha	(lit.	“daily	life	person”),	a	term	close	to	
Habermas’	“inhabitant	of	the	life	world.”	Banana	Bōto	Jikkō	Iinkai,	ed.	Inochi, shizen, kurashi: Banana bōto—Mōhitotsu 
no seikatsu o tsukuru nettowākāzu no funade,	16–17;	Jürgen	Habermas.	“New	Social	Movements.”	In	Telos,	no.	49	(1981),	
pp.	33–37.	
15	 My	thanks	to	Patricia	Steinhoff	for	this	insight.
16	 For	a	historical	discussion	and	introduction	to	some	representative	mini-komi	see	Maruyama	Hisashi.	Mini-komi no 
dōjidaishi	(Tokyo:	Heibonsha,	1985).	
17	 See	Wesley	Sasaki-Uemura.	Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan	 (Honolulu:	University	of	
Hawai‘i	Press,	2001),	for	a	detailed	study	on	the	significance	of	the	Anpo	protests	in	postwar	citizen	activism.
to	end	our	attachment	to	the	consumer	movement.”14
Yet	proposal	generation	activists	were	not	only	reacting	to	the	downfall	of	the	student	movement,	
and	nor	was	earlier	social	activism	wholly	negative	or	devoid	of	useful	strategies	and	ideas.	Though	the	
student	movement	never	achieved	its	revolutionary	goals	it	was	the	formative	social	movement	experience	
for	 proposal	movement	 activists.	 Student	 radicals	 learned	 important	 skills	 as	 they	 forged	movements	
independent	from	the	Japan	Communist	Party	(JCP).	Instead	of	marching	to	the	JCP-led	tune,	students	
took	independent	control	of	their	campus	movements	in	the	1960s.	In	the	process,	they	learned	how	to	
mobilize	participants	and	manage	resources—skills	put	to	good	use	as	they	pursued	new	activist	careers	
in	the	1970s.15
Activists	 also	 found	 the	 tried-and-true	 tactic	 of	 movement	 promotion	 through	 grassroots	
publication—he	so-called	mini-komi—an	extremely	effective	means	to	spread	information	about	their	
movements.	Publications	of	mini-komi,	as	opposed	to	masu-komi	or	the	mass	media,	exploded	during	
the	1960s	in	the	wake	of	the	US-Japan	Security	Treaty	protests.	Originally	mouthpieces	for	grassroots	
pacifism	 and	 opposition	 to	 the	 treaty,	many	 ultimately	 shifted	 focus	 to	 issues	 of	 democratization	 in	
daily	 life.	With	the	advent	of	chronic	pollution	 from	the	 late	1960s,	mini-komi	became	mouthpieces	
for	 local	opposition,	helping	to	forge	ties	and	build	activist	networks	among	geographically	separated	
residents’	movements.	Proposal	generation	activists	skillfully	adopted	the	mini-komi form,	using	similar	
homegrown	publications	to	articulate	their	new	ideology	to	target	groups.16
Important	too,	were	the	ideological	legacies	of	earlier	movements,	and	in	particular,	ideas	associated	
with	the	shimin	or	citizen	activist.	Here	again,	the	proposal	generation’s	novelty	was	clearly	contingent	
upon	 an	 extant	 historical	 legacy.	Central	 in	 the	 ideology	 of	 proposal-style	 citizens’	movements	 were	
notions	 of	 internal	 democracy,	 individual	 responsibility,	 autonomy,	 horizontal	 organization,	 political	
non-alignment,	and	part-time	participation.	These	were	not	new	ideas.	Indeed,	grassroots	activists	had	
been	debating,	testing,	and	refining	such	issues	from	at	least	the	1950s	when	small	cultural	and	learning	
circles	(sākuru)	began	to	mobilize	in	workplaces	and	in	association	with	academic	groups.	The	Security	
Treaty	struggle	in	1960	also	proved	to	be	important	in	this	ideological	development	as	activist-intellectuals	
attempted	to	define	the	contours	of	a	new	political	subject	different	from	the	student	activist,	the	party	
member,	or	the	proletarian.17	Intellectuals	such	as	Tsurumi	Shunsuke	and	Kuno	Osamu	spoke	for	the	first	
time	of	“political	citizens”	(seijiteki shimin)	who	were	motivated	not	by	devotion	to	a	vanguard-produced	
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ideology,	but	rather,	a	pragmatic	attachment	to	daily	life	as	an	autonomous	realm	worth	defending.	Such	
ideas	reverberated	among	many	normal	individuals	who	felt	unease	with	the	domestic	and	international	
implications	of	conservative	rule,	yet	were	unwilling	to	align	themselves	with	the	established	left.	
With	the	advent	of	the	anti-Vietnam	War	movement,	Beheiren,	from	the	mid-1960s,	ideas	on	citizen	
activism	reached	new	levels	of	sophistication,	as	 intellectuals	 like	Oda	Makoto	redefined	the	ordinary	
citizen	as	both	an	“aggressor”	and	a	“victim”	within	postwar	 Japanese	 society.	Beheiren,	with	 its	 loose	
organizational	style	and	focus	on	individual	responsibility	and	action,	turned	the	critical	eye	 inwards,	
using	 this	 self-reflexive	posture	 as	 a	basis	 for	 social	 activism.	Though	 the	proposal	 generation	 turned	
away	from	the	anti-establishment	rhetoric	and	praxis	of	Beheiren,	it	clearly	drew	on	the	movement’s	self	
reflexive	impulse.	Thus,	we	must	recognize	that	underlying	the	conceptual	breakthroughs	of	activists	in	
the	proposal	generation	was	an	almost	two-decade	long	intellectual	legacy	addressing	the	fundamental	
questions	of	agency,	ethos,	organization,	and	strategy	within	citizens’	movements.	In	their	eagerness	to	
promote	newness,	proposal	generation	activists	more	often	than	not	overlooked	these	important	legacies	
imparted	by	decades	of	earlier	activism.
Learning from Abroad: Finally,	 the	 proposal	 generation	 also	 drew	 on	 strategies	 and	 conceptual	
developments	from	abroad,	particularly	networking	theory	imported	from	the	United	States.	Through	
such	theoretical	discovery,	activists	learned	how	their	self-styled	networking	model	could	become	a	tool	
for	 overcoming	 the	 disadvantages	 of	 smallness,	 decentralization,	 and	 institutional	 rigidity.	 Practical	
guides	 to	 networking	 theory,	 such	 as	 Lipnack	 and	 Stamps	 landmark	 work,	 Networking: The First 
Report and Directory,	were	translated	into	Japanese	almost	as	soon	as	they	were	published	abroad,	and	
activists	traveled	to	the	US	and	Europe	to	study	the	activities	of	domestic	and	international	non-profit	
organizations.18	Such	exposure	taught	activists	that	SMOs	need	not	cling	to	amateurism	and	informality	
as	marks	of	authenticity.	The	US	example	proved	that	pragmatic	professionalization	led	to	sustainability	
and	not	necessarily	cooptation.	The	question,	of	course,	was	whether	or	not	such	models	could	work	
within	Japan’s	conservative	institutional	environment—a	challenge	activists	began	to	take	up	from	the	
early	1970s.
3. Case Study: The Association to Preserve the Earth
Theoretical Foundations
In	 1974,	 Fujita	Kazuyoshi	was	 very	much	 an	 activist	 in	 search	 of	 a	movement.	 Born	 in	 Iwate	
prefecture	 in	1947,	he	went	on	to	study	at	Sophia	University	 in	Tokyo.	Fujita	entered	university	at	a	
crucial	moment	in	the	history	of	postwar	Japanese	social	activism.	His	experiences	in	the	increasingly	
radical	student	movement	became	the	foundation	of	his	approach	to	social	activism.	“Our	60s	and	70s	
style	struggles	were	an	attempt	to	overcome	modernism	(kindaishugi),”	Fujita	recalls,	“but	looking	back,	
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I	don’t	think	we	ever	transcended	the	framework	of	modernism	we	were	trying	to	overcome.”19
The	 student	 movement	 experience	 convinced	 Fujita	 that	 accusation-style	 movements	 were	
ultimately	self-destructive,	since	dogmatism	ruptured	their	sensitivity	to	daily	life.	Outright	opposition,	
regardless	of	 its	 ethical	purity,	did	not	produce	anything	and	 in	 the	 end	amounted	 to	no	more	 than	
self-indulgence.	As	the	dispute	at	the	New	Tokyo	International	Airport	at	Narita	proved—a	dispute	in	
which	Fujita	became	involved	as	a	student	radical—opposition	only	led	to	stalemate,	and	in	some	cases,	
violence	at	the	hands	of	the	state.	The	mistake	of	student	radicals	at	Narita	had	been	to	focus	on	broad,	
abstract	issues	such	as	“Japanese	Imperialism”	or	the	“Amakudari	State.”	In	fact,	the	Narita	problem,	Fujita	
eventually	concluded,	could	only	be	solved	as	a	single	issue	in	its	own	“small	universe.”	To	be	sure,	Narita	
was	linked	at	the	very	deepest	level	to	the	political	and	economic	structure	of	conservative	rule,	but	this	
did	not	automatically	demand	a	movement	of	similar	scale.	The	failed	history	of	the	student	movement	
proved	this.	Complex	modern	societies	were	built	on	a	basis	of	many	smaller	embedded	universes.	Social	
movements,	to	be	successful,	would	have	to	attack	the	overall	problem	by	engaging	in	specific	problems	
located	in	specific	universes.	But	Fujita’s	views	on	social	activism	were	not	only	shaped	by	the	legacy	of	
radicalism.	For	Fujita,	both	the	labor	and	the	consumer	movements	had	gone	too	far	in	the	opposite	
direction.	 By	 replacing	 ideals	 with	 specific	 demands—wage	 rises,	 shorter	 working	 hours—they	were	
ultimately	coopted	by	the	system,	becoming	nothing	more	than	economic	utilitarians.20	The	consumer	
cooperative	was	a	typical	example	in	Fujita’s	view:	by	focusing	on	the	consumer	with	little	or	no	regard	
for	the	producer,	such	movements	helped	sustain	the	system	of	mass-production	and	mass-consumption,	
and	by	connection,	the	intensive	use	of	pesticides.	Falling	for	the	rhetoric	of	the	“free	market,”	coops	
became	perpetrators	and	aggressors,	compelling	farmers	to	use	pesticides	and	synthetic	fertilizers.	Surely,	
Fujita	thought,	there	must	be	an	alternative	to	the	extremes	of	radicalism	and	utilitarianism.
It	was	around	this	time	in	the	early-1970s	that	Fujita	met	a	doctor	engaged	in	natural	pesticide	
research,	and	subsequently	hit	on	the	small	universe	of	“food”	and	“agriculture”	as	one	way	to	reform	the	
universal	via	the	specific.	After	all,	the	small	universe	of	food	represented	a	“central	artery”	(kansen)	in	the	
process	of	life,	so	it	should	also	be	a	concentration	of	all	the	contradictions	in	wider	society.	Through	a	
social	movement	focused	on	“food	and	agriculture,”	Fujita	believed	he	could	realize	“specific	universality”	
(gutaiteki fuhensei).	Of	course,	on	a	practical	 level,	 the	object	need	not	necessarily	be	 food.	As	Fujita	
remarked:	“Right	now,	we	are	dealing	with	agricultural	problems,	but	medicine	and	education	are	exactly	
the	same.”	In	the	same	way	that	farmers	and	consumers	form	alternative	systems,	so	too	could	doctors	
and	patients,	or	schools	and	students.	The	point	was	that	overall	problems	needed	to	be	tackled	through	
specific	universes.21
Fujita	translated	the	idea	of	small	universes	into	his	model	of	an	SMO.	On	the	one	hand,	SMOs	
needed	to	become	self-supporting	(jiritsu shita).	In	terms	of	internal	structure,	movements	had	to	discard	
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the	old	pyramid-style	in	favor	of	a	series	of	inter-linked,	yet	autonomous,	localized	movements.	On	this	
point,	Daichi	could	draw	on	the	earlier	experience	of	movements	such	as	Beheiren,	which	experimented	
with	a	loose	network	style	in	the	1960s.	But	Fujita	developed	his	notion	of	movement	self-support	to	
include	an	economic	element,	which	went	beyond	earlier	citizens’	movements.	Once	again,	he	drew	on	
the	bitter	experience	at	Narita	Airport.	There	students	had	had	to	rely	on	membership	fees	to	pay	for	
necessities	such	as	helmets	and	weapons—hardly	a	sustainable	source	of	income.	True	independence,	as	
Fujita	saw	it,	was	nothing	other	than	the	creation	of	“material	strength”	internally.	So	long	as	movements	
relied	 on	 donations	 and	 “free	 lunches”	 (gochisō),	 their	 members	 would	 not	 become	 independent.	
Activists	had	to	“aim	for	an	organization	whereby	people	can	earn	a	living	via	the	movement,	wherein	
they	can	 feed	themselves	via	 the	movement.”	This	philosophy	ultimately	 led	Fujita	and	his	associates	
to	the	idea	of	incorporating	Daichi	into	a	stock	company—a	move	which	took	it	beyond	the	limits	of	
earlier	cooperative	and	citizens’	movements.22	Takami	Yūichi	of	the	Japan	Recycling	Movement	Citizens’	
Association	 succinctly	 articulates	 the	 logic	 behind	 such	 decisions:	 “[O]ver	 the	 past	 ten	 years	 I	 have	
continuously	 restated	 the	 easily-misinterpreted	 idea	of	 ‘making	 a	 living	 through	 citizens’	movements’	
(shimin undō de meshi o kū)….I	don’t	think	the	popular	term	volunteer	(borantia)	should	be	valorized.…I	
just	want	citizens’	movements	to	give	up	the	idea	that	everyone	has	to	bring	their	own	lunch.	I	can’t	go	
along	with	 such	dogma.	Underlying	 the	 idea	of	 ‘making	a	 living	 through	citizens’	movements’	 is	our	
desire	 to	 raise	 societal	 awareness	vis-à-vis	 the	existence	of	 so-called	NPOs….To	put	 it	 rather	crudely,	
company	employees	work	for	the	organization,	NPO	activists	work	for	society.”23
But,	on	the	other	hand,	while	Fujita’s	model	of	an	SMO	called	for	self-sufficiency,	it	also	warned	
of	 the	dangers	 of	 “communalism”	 (kyōdōtaishugi).	The	ultimate	 aim	was	 to	provide	 an	 alternative	 to	
current	socio-economic	realities	so,	from	the	very	outset,	Daichi’s	 leaders	aimed	at	an	open,	network-
style	 of	movement	 in	 touch	with	wider	 society.	 If	Daichi	 created	 an	 exclusive	 commune	 of	 farmers	
and	consumers,	it	would	lose	touch	with	the	mainstream.	Fujita	wanted	to	bring	about	social	change	
through	activism	 in	 specific	 social	universes,	but	he	did	not	want	 to	 create	 social	movement	 islands.	
Harima	Yasuo	of	the	Dandelion	House	movement	for	the	disabled	echoed	a	similar	sentiment:	“[W]
e	realized	that	Japanese	organizations	have	a	tendency	to	end	up	like	Maruyama	Masao’s	‘octopus	pots,’	
so	 that	 is	why	we	 imported	 networking	 theory	 from	 the	US.”	 “Networking	 gave	 us	 an	 opportunity	
to	 relativize	ourselves	 and	keep	 things	 in	perspective.	Once	 [our	networks]	became	 internationalized,	
we	 could	 compare	 Japan	with	 the	outside	world.”	Like	Fujita,	most	 in	 the	proposal	 generation	were	
convinced	that	only	open-ended	movements	could	overcome	the	tendency	for	organizational	isolation	in	
Japanese	citizens’	movements.
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Fujita	thus	imagined	Daichi	as	a	principled,	yet	pragmatic	and	open	movement	that	would	avoid	
the	dual	polarities	of	idealism	on	the	one	hand,	and	economism	on	the	other.	Of	course,	balancing	ideals	
and	economics	would	not	be	easy.	Would	members	be	willing	to	pay	more	for	produce	because	it	cost	
farmers	more	to	grow	organically?	Would	they	accept	deliveries	of	 insect	damaged	produce	as	part	of	
their	involvement	in	the	movement?	Would	they	part	with	the	convenience	of	going	to	the	supermarket	
to	purchase	any	kind	of	produce	they	desired?	These	were	real	challenges	facing	Daichi’s	leaders	as	they	
attempted	to	grow	their	movement	from	the	mid	1970s.	In	the	end,	success	would	hinge	on	two	factors:	
the	 formation	 of	 realistic	 solutions	 to	 these	 problems,	 and	 the	 degree	 to	which	 they	 could	 convince	
potential	members	that	these	solutions	were	indeed	realistic—in	other	words,	the	persuasive	power	of	
their	discourse	of	proposal.
Members and Shareholders: Mobilizing a Movement
From	its	inception	in	1975	until	early	1977,	Daichi	operated	on	a	customer	base	of	only	200	to	300	
people,	roughly	organized	into	about	20	collective	purchasing	stations	in	the	Tokyo	area.24	The	fact	that	
200	to	300	people	would	join	their	movement	gave	Fujita	and	his	colleagues	confidence	in	the	quality	of	
their	produce	and	their	message.	But	the	reality	was	that	with	such	small	numbers	the	movement	would	
never	be	self-sustaining.	If	Fujita’s	ideas	were	to	function	as	a	truly	effective	mobilizing	force	they	needed	
to	reach	a	wider	audience	than	that	provided	by	word	of	mouth.	
The	solution	came	in	April	1977	when,	with	support	from	the	Seibu	Department	Store,	Daichi	
held	a	“Pesticide-free	Vegetable	Fair”	in	the	store’s	Shopping Park	at	Ikebukuro	station	in	Tokyo.	Together	
with	vocalist	Katō	Tokiko,	“guest	salespersons”	included	actress	Nakayama	Chiatsu,	actor	Ei	Rokusuke,	
commentator	Yoshitake	Teruko,	and	novelist	Nosaka	Akiyuki.25	Fujita	views	this	vegetable	fair	as	a	crucial	
event	in	Daichi’s	development.	After	attention	in	the	mass	media,	the	member	base	surged	immediately	
from	300	to	around	800	and,	more	importantly,	Daichi’s	message	now	reached	many	more	ears	than	
it	had	to	date.	As	Fujita	recalls:	“We	figured	that	if	these	800	members	told	just	ten	friends	about	the	
movement	we	would	be	able	to	reach	self-sufficiency.”	His	prediction	turned	out	to	be	correct:	what	was	
a	movement	of	20	stations	before	the	April	event	rose	to	200	member	stations	by	late	1977,	comprising	
a	total	membership	of	over	1,000.26
But	 this	 spectacular	 growth	 brought	with	 it	 a	 new	 set	 of	 challenges	 that	 forced	 Fujita	 and	 his	
associates	to	rethink	their	developmental	plans	for	Daichi.	While	the	movement	was	still	small	it	could	
rely	on	financial	support	from	Fujimoto	Toshio	and	his	celebrity	wife,	Katō	Tokiko.	But	as	operations	
expanded	 Daichi’s	 leaders	 realized	 the	 limitations	 of	 relying	 on	 individuals—particularly	 in	 matters	
financial.	In	simple	terms,	Daichi	could	not	continue	to	grow	if	it	remained	an	informal	“association.”	
“We	couldn’t	even	borrow	money	to	buy	a	delivery	truck—Fujimoto	had	to	do	it	 in	his	own	name,”	
Fujita	recalls.	Economic	realities	thus	called	for	some	kind	of	organizational	transformation.	
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Until	 the	 enactment	 of	 Japan’s	 Special	 Nonprofit	 Organization	 Law	 in	 1998,	 civil	 society	
organizations	 in	 Japan	 were	 stifled	 by	 “one	 of	 the	 most	 antagonistic	 regulatory	 frameworks	 among	
industrialized	democracies.”27	Specifically,	articles	 in	the	1896	Uniform	Civil	Code	made	it	extremely	
difficult	 for	 civil	 society	 organizations	 to	 gain	 legal	 status	 as	 so-called	 nonprofit	 public-interest	 legal	
persons.	In	effect,	this	meant	that	groups	either	had	to	remain	informal	(in	a	legal	sense)	or,	 in	some	
cases,	 choose	 the	 path	 of	 incorporation.	 While	 the	 former	 path	 was	 certainly	 less	 complicated,	 as	
Daichi	discovered	in	the	late	1970s,	the	lack	of	legal	status	proved	a	significant	barrier	to	organizational	
expansion	and	sustainability.	The	path	of	informality	meant	that	groups	could	not	“open	bank	accounts,	
hire	staff,	own	property,	sign	lease	agreements	for	office	space,	undertake	joint	projects	with	domestic	
government	bodies,	or	even,	on	a	mundane	level,	lease	a	photocopy	machine.”28	In	Daichi’s	case,	it	was	
not	only	a	photocopy	machine,	but	also	a	delivery	 truck.	Moreover,	as	 the	number	of	 staff	members	
increased,	questions	relating	to	labor	standards	and	staff	insurance	also	surfaced.	Operating	as	a	“private	
store”	(kojin shōten),	while	simple,	obviously	had	its	limitations.
It	was	around	this	time	that	Fujita	and	his	associates	began	to	meet	together	regularly	on	Fridays	
to	discuss	their	ideas	for	the	future	of	Daichi.	These	meetings,	which	they	informally	called	the	“Friday	
Group”	 (Kin’yō no Kai),	 ultimately	 laid	 the	 foundations	 for	Daichi’s	 organizational	 structure	 and	 the	
Association’s	 ideas	 vis-à-vis	 the	 organic	 movement	 in	 Japan.	 The	 Friday	 Group’s	 brainstorming	 on	
organizational	 form	 reveals	 how	 ideas	were	 a	 crucial	 factor	 shaping	 the	 strategy	 of	 proposal	 and	 the	
approach	of	such	movements	to	conservative	institutions.	
As	 the	 Friday	 Group	 discussed	 Daichi’s	 options,	 they	 realized	 there	 was	 another	 possible	
organizational	form:	the	consumer	cooperative.	But	as	Fujita	explains,	from	the	very	outset	the	group	
was	opposed	to	the	coop	form	on	a	number	of	ideological	grounds.	First,	legal	stipulations	meant	that	
becoming	a	cooperative	would	have	forced	Daichi	to	break	up	its	operations	into	legally	independent	
prefectural	units.	Division,	all	agreed,	would	only	produce	isolated	prefecture-level	“octopus	pots”	with	
little	need	to	interact	outside	their	own	membership	of	producers	and	consumers.	This	conflicted	with	
the	 group’s	 concept	 of	 networking	 and	 represented	 the	 kind	 of	 “communalism”	 that	 Fujita	 wanted	
to	 avoid.	 Second,	 the	 cooperative	 model	 potentially	 diverged	 from	 Daichi’s	 ideal	 of	 organizational	
independence.	 Official	 recognition	 by	 prefectural	 bureaucracies	 as	 a	 lifestyle	 cooperative	 union,	 the	
group	worried,	might	ultimately	compromise	Daichi’s	independence.29	Third,	the	consumer	cooperative	
model	conflicted	with	Daichi’s	vision	of	the	organic	food	movement.	In	the	end,	consumer	cooperatives	
were	only	interested	in	price.	They	may	give	lip	service	to	the	plight	of	farmers,	but	when	push	came	to	
shove,	they	always	came	down	on	the	side	of	the	consumer	and	lower	prices.	Conversely,	Daichi	was	in	
search	of	a	holistic	solution	that	embraced,	rather	than	accused	or	ostracized,	farmers,	so	conversion	into	
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a	consumer	cooperative	made	no	sense	at	all.30
Similar	 ideological	 reservations,	 coupled	 with	 legal	 restrictions	 on	 membership	 numbers	 and	
capital	base,	also	prevented	Daichi	from	becoming	either	a	corporate	juridical	person	(shadan hōjin)	or	
a	legally	incorporated	foundation	(zaidan hōjin).	The	only	pathways	were	to	remain	a	“private	store”	or	
to	incorporate	as	a	stock	company	(kabushiki gaisha).	In	September	1977,	Fujita	and	his	Friday	Group	
chose	the	latter.	The	influence	of	legal	barriers	certainly	was	a	key	factor	in	this	decision.	But	we	miss	
some	 important	 details	 if	we	 fail	 to	 take	 our	 analysis	 beyond	 the	 effect	 of	 such	 institutions.	 Indeed,	
institutions	can	only	partly	 tell	us	why	Daichi	 rejected	 the	cooperative	model.	Moreover,	 they	 tell	us	
almost	nothing	with	respect	to	the	specifics	of	the	company	Daichi	ultimately	created.	After	all,	how	
would	the	Association	to	Protect	the	Earth—a	group	which	claimed	to	be	an	alternative	to	the	leviathan	
of	mass	production	 and	mass	 consumption—maintain	 its	 principles,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 adopt	 an	
organizational	form	that	lay	at	the	very	heart	of	the	modern	market	system?
The	answer,	as	it	turned	out,	lay	in	the	past,	as	Daichi	drew	on	the	pool	of	strategies	formulated	
by	earlier	movements.	By	loosely	implementing	a	single	share	system	(one	share	per	member),	similar	
to	 that	used	by	Beheiren,	Minamata	activists,	 and	other	movements	 in	 the	early	1970s,	Daichi	could	
simultaneously	avoid	creating	“oppressive	violent	capital,”	and	promote	its	basic	principles	of	individual	
participation	and	internal	democracy.	Daichi	would	use	the	single	share	model	to	propose	a	different	
style	 of	 company	driven	not	 by	 the	 bottom-line	 desire	 for	 profit,	 but	 instead,	 the	 transformation	 in	
patterns	of	agriculture,	distribution,	and	consumption.	As	Fujita	explained,	stock	capital	was	really	an	
empty	vessel	into	which	the	modern	market	had	inserted	its	own	interpretation.	But	this	was	not	the	only	
interpretation	possible.	Drawing	on	Beheiren’s	reconceptualization	of	the	“share,”	Daichi	could	propose	a	
new	kind	of	company	and	in	the	process	become	the	model	for	a	new	socio-economic	order.
The	 adoption	 of	 a	 single	 share	model,	 according	 to	 Fujita,	 solved	 one	 of	 the	 greatest	 flaws	 of	
Japanese	social	and	cooperative	movements.	Previously,	employees	(shokuin)	 in	unions,	coops	and	the	
like	were	not	considered	members	of	the	movement.	Officially,	they	were	merely	office	staff.	“In	reality,	
however,	[they]	controlled	the	movement,	and	this	produced	Japanese	style	bureaucratization.	Members	
had	no	agency.	Instead,	office	bureaucrats,	under	the	guise	of	officialdom—indeed	by	brandishing	this	
pretense	 (tatemae)—skillfully	manipulated	movements.”	But	Daichi	 Incorporated	would	be	different.	
Staff	would	be	shareholders	too,	empowered	to	make	proposals	and	guide	the	movement	openly	as	equals	
with	consumers	and	producers.	If	consumer-members	failed	to	exercise	their	rights	as	shareholders,	they	
could	potentially	lose	out.	Of	course,	in	reality,	Fujita	expected	that	this	system	would	lead	to	more	rather	
than	less	participation,	creating	an	environment	in	which	all	members	took	responsibility	for	pursuing	
their	own	interests.	This	would	make	Daichi	different	from	run-of-the-mill,	for-profit	stock	companies.	
The	 articulation	 of	 innovative	 ideas	 by	 Fujita	 and	 other	 leaders	 at	 this	 stage	 proved	 crucial	 in	
translating	the	Friday	Group’s	ideas	into	reality.	Drawing	on,	and	further	developing,	ideas	and	attitudes	
that	had	been	percolating	within	citizens’	movements	for	over	two	decades,	Daichi’s	 leaders	set	about	
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reframing	their	movement	as	a	professional,	locally-organized	network	of	like-minded	individuals.	Leaders	
consciously	avoided	rigid	ideological	discourse	in	favor	of	a	pragmatic	ethos	based	on	the	affirmation	of	
daily	 life.	In	keeping	with	the	movement’s	support	 for	Japanese	farmers,	Daichi	set	about	convincing	
consumer-members	that	limited	use	of	pesticides	was	unavoidable	given	current	realties,	and	hence	had	
to	be	accepted.	Instead	of	an	all-or-nothing	approach,	Daichi	argued	that	eradication	of	pesticides	was	a	
goal	to	be	achieved	through	cooperation	between	consumers	and	producers.	The	Association	would	only	
ask	members	to	do	what	they	could.	Farmer-members	would	promise	to	avoid	pesticide	use	“as	much	
as	possible,”	and	consumer-members	would	partially	sacrifice	their	freedom	of	product	choice	in	return	
for	a	promise	of	variety	and	safety.	But,	as	explained	above,	the	most	innovative	proposal	of	the	Friday	
Group	was	to	convert	the	organization	into	an	incorporated	stock	company	with	thousands	of	single	
shareholders:	in	other	words,	to	transform	citizen	activism	into	a	capitalist	project.	
Daichi’s	 leaders	presented	 their	 ideas	 for	 the	 stock	company	to	members	 in	September	1977	 in	
a	proposal	 titled	“For	 the	Development	of	 a	New	Life	 Industry.”	Members	would	be	asked	 to	 invest	
5,000	yen	for	a	single	par-value	share	in	the	company.	Fujita	decided	on	this	amount	because,	on	the	
one	hand,	this	was	the	minimum	level	required	to	raise	the	necessary	capital,	and	on	the	other,	was	an	
amount	housewives	 could	 invest	without	 their	 husbands’	 knowledge.	Moreover,	 as	Fujita	 explains,	 it	
was	an	amount	housewives	would	probably	be	willing	to	lose	in	the	event	the	company	went	bust.	The	
following	extract	from	the	1977	proposal	is	a	typical	example	of	the	discursive	strategy	used	by	Daichi	
to	conceptualize	its	new	social	movement	model,	and	for	this	reason	deserves	reproduction	at	length.
For the Development of a New Life Industry
Building	 on	 the	 experience	 and	 achievements	 of	 two	 years	 of	 [Daichi]	 activism,	 we	 intend	 to	
establish	 “Daichi	 Incorporated.”	 Rather	 than	 simply	 another	 stock	 company,	 we	 want	 to	 create	 an	
organization	 in	 which	 everyone	 will	 participate,	 and	 in	 that	 way	 protect	 the	 interests	 of	 all	 people	
connected	to	the	company.	Producers,	consumers,	and	those	who	contribute	at	 the	distribution	stage	
will	all	be	the	shareholders	who	form	this	“stock	company	contributing	to	the	lives	and	health	of	people.”	
[Our	enterprise]	will	not	be	[based	on]	the	questionable	“bottom-line	profit	motive,”	and	opposition	
between	producers	and	consumers	will	be	non-existent.	This	is	because	[our]	company’s	first	priority	will	
be	to	“guard	the	interests	of	shareholders.”	[…]
We	will	establish	“Daichi	Incorporated”	to	protect	life	and	health,	and	also	as	a	lively	dialogue	with	
nature.	This	company	must	not	start	out	as	one	which	protects	the	interests	of	a	particular	group,	or	is	
manipulated	by	a	specific	stratum	of	people.	To	this	end,	the	following	represent	the	founding	principles	
of	our	company.	By	staying	faithful	to	these	principles,	Daichi	Incorporated	will	be	able	to	fulfill	its	social	
mission	and	its	social	responsibility.
(1)	Daichi	Inc.	will	proactively	contribute	to	the	reconceptualization	of	diet,	which	sustains	human	
existence,	and	agriculture,	which	sustains	 societal	existence.	Moreover,	by	growing,	distributing,	
and	consuming	safe,	delicious,	and	nutritious	foods	we	want	to	fulfill	our	responsibility	toward	the	
current	age	and	the	future.
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(2)	In	keeping	with	the	aspirations	our	age,	Daichi	Inc.’s	primary	principle	will	be	“to	protect	life	
and	health.”	We	will	do	this	by	protecting	nature,	by	harmonizing	social	relations,	and	by	doing	
work	that,	in	terms	of	human	daily	life,	is	self-fulfilling.
(3)	Daichi	Inc.	must	be	run	so	that	the	flow	of	people,	goods	and	information	is	not	impeded.	By	
impediments,	we	refer	to	bureaucratized	and	exclusionary	human	relations,	speculative	trading	of	
produce,	or	secretive,	misleading	use	of	information.	We	will	establish	Daichi	Corporation	as	an	
“open	stock	company”	(hirakareta kabushiki gaisha)	without	impediments	to	the	flow	of	people,	
goods,	or	information.	It	will	be	a	corporation	engaged	in	a	landmark	endeavor.31
Daichi’s	 mobilizing	 efforts	 were	 extremely	 successful.	 At	 a	 par-value	 of	 5000	 yen,	Daichi	 Inc.	
managed	to	raise	16	million	yen—a	total	of	3,200	shares.	Katō	Tokiko	invested	4.5	million	yen,	making	
her	the	largest	shareholder	with	some	900	(26%)	shares.	This	meant	that	the	remaining	2,300	shares	were	
spread	among	a	membership	approaching	2000—close	to	Fujita’s	ideal	of	a	single	share	distribution.32	
On	 3	December	 1977,	 shareholders	 in	 the	 new	 company	met	 at	Daichi’s	 office	 in	 a	 Baptist	 hall	 in	
Shinjuku.	Answering	criticisms	in	the	media	and	from	other	grassroots	organizations,	Fujimoto	Toshio—
Daichi’s	first	president—defended	the	decision	to	incorporate	on	the	basis	of	“movement	independence”	
and	because	this	decision	would	“create	a	movement	in	which	producers	and	consumers	were	united.”	
Moreover,	unlike	agricultural	associations	(nōkyō)	or	consumer	coops	(seikyō),	Daichi	Inc.	would	not	be	
bound	by	bureaucratic	rules	and	regulations.33
Defending the Message of Proposal
Of	course	not	all	corners	of	society	agreed	with	Fujita’s	idea	of	SMOs	becoming	stock	companies.	
From	the	time	they	first	aired	the	idea	until	at	least	the	mid	1980s,	Daichi’s	leaders	came	in	for	severe	
criticism	from	both	producer	and	consumer	organizations.	Beginning	in	the	early	1980s,	Daichi	faced	
a	 constant	barrage	of	 criticism	 from	 the	 Japan	Organic	Agriculture	Association	 (JOAA)	 for	 “creating	
unnecessary	 barriers	 between	 consumers	 and	 producers,”	 and	 from	 the	 consumer	 movement	 for	 its	
decision	 to	 become	 a	 stock	 company	 instead	 of	 a	 coop.	Moreover,	 in	 1982,	Daichi	 came	under	 the	
spotlight	in	the	mainstream	press	when	a	high-circulation	monthly	magazine,	drawing	on	discord	within	
the	movement,	published	an	article	questioning	the	very	validity	of	the	movement’s	supposedly	“organic”	
produce.		
Fujita	and	his	associates	were	quick	to	respond	to	these	criticisms	since	they	realized	the	survival	
of	the	movement	depended	as	much—if	not	more—on	the	legitimacy	of	Daichi’s	message	as	it	did	on	
the	 authenticity	or	 “organic-ness”	of	 farmers’	produce.	As	 explained	 above,	Fujita	wanted	 to	 create	 a	
movement,	first	and	foremost,	to	transform	consumer	attitudes,	so	from	the	outset	movement	ideology	
and	its	articulation	by	activists	received	close	attention.	This	was	true	of	most	other	movements	claiming	
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to	 propose	 alternatives	 in	 the	 early	 1970s:	 proponents	 of	 recycling	 had	 to	 justify	 the	 use	 of	 second-
hand	goods	in	the	face	of	rising	affluence;	peace	activists	needed	to	convince	a	skeptical	audience	that	
grassroots	dialogue	between	nations	was	a	productive	alternative	 to	official	diplomacy;	and	advocates	
for	 the	 physically	 and	mentally	 impaired	 had	 to	 explain	 how	 disabled	 people	 could	 be	 creative	 and	
productive	in	a	complex,	technological	society.	In	short,	the	challenge	for	the	proposal	generation	was	to	
convince	a	skeptical	public	that	politicians,	bureaucrats,	academics,	and	corporate	leaders	did	not	have	a	
monopoly	on	innovation,	and	that	normal	people	could	change	their	society	from	the	bottom	up	using	
strategies	other	than	protest	or	revolution;	hence,	the	vigor	with	which	Daichi	and	others	responded	to	
critics	and	defended	their	proposals	in	the	public	sphere.	Though	certainly	a	threat	to	the	authenticity	of	
Daichi,	external	criticisms	actually	had	a	positive	impact	in	that	they	forced	Fujita	and	others	to	clarify	to	
their	constituency	just	what	a	“proposal-style	citizens’	movement”	meant	in	practice.
Daichi’s	greatest	public	challenge	came	in	the	form	of	an	exposé	titled	“Distinguishing	the	Facts	
and	Falsities	 of	Natural	Foods”	 in	 the	October	1982	 edition	of	 the	monthly	magazine,	Ushio.34	The	
article’s	author,	Hiraoka	Yōichi,	claimed	that	the	recent	boom	in	“natural”	“safe”	foods	was,	in	fact,	built	
on	a	series	of	untruths.	Specifically,	he	declared	that	organic	producers	regularly	used	synthetic	fertilizers	
and	pesticides,	and	that	organic	retailers	were	well	aware	of	this	practice.	Moreover,	based	on	his	own	
investigations,	Hiraoka	pointed	out	that	the	label	“pesticide-free”	did	not	amount	to	“non-pesticide	use,”	
but	merely	that	inspected	produce	did	not	reveal	significant	residual	levels.	“In	other	words,”	he	argued,	
“the	vast	majority	of	processed	foods	[in	organic	stores]	are	by	no	means	pesticide-free.	It	is	simply	that	
no	residual	pesticides	are	detected.”35
Hiraoka	 laid	 out	 his	 attack	 on	 Daichi	 towards	 the	 end	 the	 same	 article	 under	 the	 ominous	
subtitle	“Organic	Farming	Laid	Waste.”	Here	Hiraoka	recounted	his	experiences	in	the	farming	town	of	
Tamazukuri	in	Tochigi	prefecture.	“I	heard	about	Iida	Mitsugu,	an	organic	farmer	in	Tamazukuri-chō	
who	was	extremely	upset	about	dishonest	practices	among	other	organic	farmers,	so	I	decided	to	pay	him	
a	visit.”	Hiraoka	described	how	Tamazukuri-chō	had	become	a	kind	of	“organic	farming	Mecca.”	Local	
farmers	contracted	with	distributors—primarily	Daichi—who	in	turn	delivered	their	produce	directly	to	
consumers	and	organic	retail	outlets	in	the	Kantō	region.	He	explained	how	Iida	had	engaged	in	organic	
farming	for	about	ten	years,	during	which	time	Daichi	distributed	his	produce.	But	as	a	result	of	Daichi’s	
“halfhearted”	(iikagensa)	practices	he	withdrew	from	the	organization	about	a	year	ago.	According	to	Iida,	
of	the	fifteen	or	sixteen	organic	farmers	in	Tamazukuri-chō,	all	were	“phonies”	(inchiki).	Iida	based	his	
criticism	on	four	facts.	First,	farmers	did	not	make	their	own	compost	but	merely	spread	manure	and	in	
some	cases	human	feces.	As	a	result,	produce	was	easily	diseased,	and	in	the	end	most	had	no	choice	but	
to	use	pesticides.	Second,	tomatoes	and	cucumbers	were	being	cultivated	in	plastic	greenhouses.	Third,	
it	was	 common	practice	 for	organic	 farmers	 to	purchase	damaged	produce	 from	 regular	 farmers	 and	
ship	it	as	“organic.”	And	fourth,	in	the	same	way,	organic	farmers	often	purchased	damaged	produce	on	
the	retail	market	and	reshipped	it	as	“organic	produce.”	And	even	worse,	Hiraoka	claimed	that	Daichi	
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“knows	full-well	of	these	practices	and	yet	it	remains	silent.”36
Hiraoka	 recounted	his	visit	 to	one	of	 the	 farms	 in	 the	area	with	 Iida	Mitsugu.	“The	cucumber	
leaves	were	infected	with	Donwy	Mildew	and	had	turned	a	yellowish	color.	Actually,	most	of	them	were	
withered.	There	was	a	large	plastic	greenhouse	with	a	boiler	attached,	and	inside	tomatoes	were	being	
cultivated.	To	be	sure,	there	was	a	sign	outside	reading	‘Organic	Farming	Area.’	There	was	a	huge	pile	of	
black,	solidified	manure	that	had	been	exposed	to	the	rain.	‘This	won’t	end	up	as	compost,	it	will	just	rot,’	
Mr.	Iida	commented.”	But	perhaps	most	damaging	of	all	for	Daichi	was	Hiraoka’s	interview	with	Horita	
Tatsurō,	leader	of	the	organic	farming	group	that	shipped	its	produce	via	the	Association.	“Of	course,	
Mr.	Horita	didn’t	say	that	he	himself	was	doing	so,”	Hiraoka	recounted,	“but	he	admitted	that	others	
were	using	pesticides	when	he	said	‘there	are	various	kinds	of	people	selling	vegetables	on	the	premise	of	
organic	farming	methods.	Some	of	them	use	pesticides,	some	do	not’.”37
What	then	of	Daichi’s	response?	“The	Association	to	Preserve	the	Earth	does	not	deny	the	use	of	
pesticides,”	Hiraoka	reported.	“But	they	say	these	are…vegetable-based,	and	moreover,	are	utilized	far	less	
than	normal	[farms].”	For	example,	in	the	case	of	tomatoes,	organic	farmers	working	with	Daichi	only	
sprayed	vegetable-based	pesticides	six	to	ten	times	in	one	growth	cycle,	as	opposed	to	the	normal	practice	
of	ten	to	twenty	times.	For	bell	peppers,	Daichi	farmers	sprayed	a	maximum	of	three	times	as	opposed	
to	the	usual	six	to	ten	times.	Daichi	admitted	that	its	fruit	farmers	used	synthetic	chemical	pesticides,	
but	that	they	did	so	in	a	much	reduced	way.	To	Hiraoka’s	suggestion	that	such	practices	hardly	differed	
from	regular	farming	methods,	the	Daichi	representative	“cleverly”	commented:	“[Farmers]	are	required	
to	report	vis-à-vis	fertilizers	used	for	contracted	produce,	and	we	have	faith	in	this.	Though	we	do	indeed	
contract	with	farmers,	we	do	not	contract	with	the	totality	of	their	fields.	So	it	may	be	the	case	that	they	
use	pesticides	and	chemical	fertilizers	on	areas	not	under	contract.”38	For	Hiraoka,	however,	the	sum	total	
of	these	practices	in	the	“natural	food”	market	ultimately	left	consumers	with	only	one	choice:	“In	the	
end	there	may	be	no	other	way	but	to	purchase	produce	directly	from	an	organic	farmer	you	can	trust	
and	then	clean	it	yourself.”39
For	Fujita,	Hiraoka’s	 critical	 article	 in	Ushio	was	 a	 classic	 example	 of	 the	misguided	 accusatory	
logic	 of	 the	 1960s,	 and	 while	 it	 posed	 a	 serious	 threat	 to	 Daichi’s	 legitimacy,	 it	 also	 provided	 an	
excellent	 opportunity	 for	 Fujita	 to	 articulate	Daichi’s	 alternative	model	 for	 production,	 distribution,	
and	consumption.	Fujita’s	response	to	Hiraoka	appeared	in	the	December	1982	edition	of	Ushio—two	
months	after	the	original	article.	“From	my	reading	of	this	article,”	Fujita	began,	“I	can	only	conclude	
that	the	author,	Mr.	Hiraoka,	has	misunderstood	today’s	organic	farming	movement	in	a	fundamental	
way.”	As	Fujita	explained,	the	organic	farming	movement	originally	stemmed	from	a	coming	together	of	
aspirations.	On	the	one	hand,	consumers	wanted	to	purchase	safe	produce,	and	on	the	other,	farmers	felt	
more	and	more	uncomfortable	with	the	pesticide-intensive	agriculture	demanded	by	the	market.	With	
the	enactment	of	the	Basic	Law	on	Agriculture	(Nōgyō kihon hō)	in	1961,	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	
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Forestry,	 and	 Fisheries	 (MAFF)	 fervently	 implemented	 a	 policy	 of	 agricultural	 modernization.	This	
policy,	 according	 to	Fujita,	was	 itself	 part	 of	 the	more	 general	 postwar	project	 of	 returning	 Japan	 to	
international	society	as	a	major	industrial	nation.	Agriculture,	like	all	other	areas	of	the	economy,	was	
subject	 to	a	 form	of	“forced	 industrialization.”	 In	 return	 for	 their	 loyal	obedience	 to	 this	project,	 the	
government	promised	farmers	a	“bright	future.”	But	the	reality,	however,	was	different.40
“Seeing	the	affluent,	convenient	society	of	the	cities,	youths	began	to	abandon	farming	villages	[…]	
With	a	decreased	working	population	[farmers]	had	to	rely	more	and	more	on	mechanization,	pesticides,	
and	chemical	fertilizers.”	Furthermore,	“produce	in	short	supply	was	imported,	all	in	the	name	of	the	
‘international	division	of	labor’.”	In	return,	Japan	sent	its	textiles,	electronics,	and	automobiles	out	onto	
the	world	market.	“Japan	achieved	high	economic	growth	as	an	industrialized	nation;	amid	cries	for	mass	
production	and	mass	consumption	it	made	the	‘affluent	and	convenient	society’	a	reality—it	was	indeed	a	
brilliant	national	policy.”	But	there	was	a	price	to	be	paid	for	this	national	success:	“convenience”	obliged	
farmers	to	break	with	the	natural	cycle.	Consumers	wanted	to	eat	tomatoes	and	cucumbers	in	winter	
and	the	only	way	to	do	this	was	with	pesticides,	mechanization,	and	chemical	fertilizers.	The	result	was	
new	forms	of	plant	disease,	decreases	in	soil	fertility,	the	creation	of	wasteland,	and	ultimately	a	kind	of	
“vicious	cycle	of	drug	dependence”	in	agriculture.	The	more	farmers	relied	on	chemical	fertilizers,	the	
more	they	needed	them.	Moreover,	constantly	exposed	to	synthetic	chemical	agents,	farmers	themselves	
started	 to	become	 sick.	This,	Fujita	 suggested,	was	 the	 true	 legacy	of	MAFF’s	 fanatical	 campaign	 for	
modernization	in	agriculture	after	1961.41	“But	it’s	not	that	anyone	[in	particular]	was	to	blame,”	Fujita	
pointed	out,	rather	“this	is	how	our	pursuit	of	an	‘affluent	and	convenient	daily	life’	ended	up.	In	the	
midst	of	high	growth	both	farmers	and	urban	consumers	were	gratified	by	convenience	and	affluence.	
[It	was	both]	who	promoted	mass	consumption,	squandered	natural	resources,	increased	environmental	
destruction,	and	devastated	agriculture	to	a	point	from	which	it	could	never	return.”	All	of	this	was	the	
starting	point	of	the	organic	farming	movement.42
“More	than	anything	else,	a	change	in	consumer	mentality	was	called	for….That	is,	an	absolutely	
vital	element	of	this	movement	had	to	be	close	cooperation	constructed	on	a	basis	of	deep	trust	between	
producers	 and	 consumers.”	 Agriculture	 did	 not	 turn	 for	 the	 worse	 of	 its	 own	 accord.	 It	 happened,	
according	 to	 Fujita,	 because	 “[w]e	 Japanese,	 as	 a	 totality,”	 demanded	 an	 “affluent	 and	 convenient	
society.”	 “Without	 a	 second	 thought	 we	 gave	 our	 children	 food	 filled	 with	 preservatives	 because	 it	
was	 ‘convenient	 and	easy.’	We	used	 synthetic	 soaps.	Without	a	hint	of	hesitation,	we	used	electricity	
produced	at	nuclear	power	 stations	as	 though	 this	was	 totally	normal.	We	seized	 the	 latest	 electronic	
and	manufactured	goods	that	appeared	[on	the	market]	one	after	another.	We	continued	to	squander	
petroleum.	If	there	is	such	a	thing	as	a	trend	of	the	times,	then	we—all	of	us—joined	together	to	produce	
this	 trend.”	Here	Fujita	 approached	 the	crux	of	his	 argument.43	 “The	 thing	 I	want	 to	problematize,”	
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Fujita	continued,	“is	Hiraoka’s	preconception	that	organic	farmers	must	not	use	pesticides	or	chemical	
fertilizers….It	is	consumers’	self-righteousness	and	lack	of	understanding	of	farmers	that	produces	such	
a	preconception….To	simplify	things,	let’s	say	for	example	that	the	farmers	Hiraoka	refers	to	are	actually	
using	pesticides	and	chemical	fertilizers.	What	is	missing	from	this	article	is	any	explanation	as	to	why	
farmers	are	forced	to	use	pesticides	and	chemical	fertilizers	[in	the	first	place].”	What	Hiraoka	failed	to	
point	out	was	that	all	Japanese—he	included—were	responsible	for	creating	a	system	and	a	society	in	
which	farmers	have	no	choice	but	to	resort	to	such	methods.	“In	other	words,	[Hiraoka]	and	I	too	are	the	
aggressors	(kagaisha)	who	create	such	a	society.	At	the	very	least	we	bear	some	of	the	responsibility.	This	
is	something	we	need	to	realize.”44
Sixteen	 years	 earlier	 in	1966,	Oda	Makoto	 first	 articulated	his	 idea	of	 the	 individual	 citizen	 as	
aggressor	in	the	Vietnam	War.	Ariyoshi	Sawako	did	this	again	in	the	early	1970s,	characterizing	consumers	
as	aggressors.	Now,	in	1982,	Fujita	Kazuyoshi	used	the	same	logic	to	conceptualize	Daichi’s	approach	
to	consumption	and	production.	But	unlike	Beheiren,	and	similar	to	Ariyoshi,	Fujita	and	his	associates	
took	this	logic	beyond	the	realm	of	criticism	and	accusation.	All	Japanese—farmers	and	consumers—
were	implicated	in	the	postwar	project	of	economic	growth	and	environmental	destruction.	Yet	there	was	
no	ground	to	be	made	through	continued	accusation.	Consumers	needed	to	rethink	their	approach	to	
consumption,	they	had	to	reconsider	their	role	in	creating	the	“vicious	circle”	of	pesticide	dependence	
and,	above	all,	they	needed	to	reappraise	their	own	expectations	vis-à-vis	the	kind	of	demands	they	would	
make	on	organic	farmers.
Fujita,	in	fact,	had	been	developing	this	logic	since	Daichi’s	inception	in	the	mid	1970s	under	the	
rubric	of	organic	produce	as	“food	for	thought”	(kangaeru sozai).	Within	this	alternative	logic,	an	insect-
damaged	organic	daikon	radish	was	no	longer	“unsellable	produce,”	but	rather	was	conceptualized	as	“food	
for	thought.”	As	consumers	removed	insect-damaged	portions,	as	they	made	allowances	for	misshapen	
produce,	as	they	washed	off	residual	soil—as	they	did	all	these	things	they	would	simultaneously	learn	
something	important	about	their	role	in	the	food	cycle	as	produce	moved	from	the	field	to	the	kitchen.	
Moreover,	 their	 acceptance	 of	 such	 produce	would	 be	 a	 pragmatic	 expression	 of	 the	 desire	 to	 break	
away	from	their	earlier	role	as	consumer-aggressors.	Thus,	participation	in	Daichi	was	as	much	about	
transformation	of	 individual	values	and	practices	as	 it	was	about	obtaining	organic	produce.	It	 is	this	
emphasis	on	individuals	changing,	indeed,	reforming,	their	own	patterns	of	life	that	distinguishes	Daichi	
and	other	cohort	organizations	from	the	1960s	generation	of	citizen	activism.	The	critical	eye	turned	
inwards	and	became	self-reflexive.	But	more	than	this,	proposal	generation	activists	put	a	pragmatic	spin	
on	this	 self-reflexivity,	connecting	 it	directly	 to	real	 solutions	 in	the	real	world.	Fujita	articulated	this	
sentiment	to	members	succinctly	in	1981.
Obtaining	safe	produce	is	not	in	itself	the	objective	of	our	movement.	Rather,	the	origin	of	our	
movement	 is	 a	 reconsideration—through	 the	 process	 of	 obtaining	 safe-to-eat	 produce—of	 the	
age	in	which	we	are	living	and	of	our	lifestyle.	To	this	end,	agricultural	produce	is	our	“food	for	
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thought”….Nobody	wants	to	eat	vegetables	covered	in	pesticides.	But	we	too	have	played	a	role	in	
creating	this	situation,	and	have	no	right	to	look	at	farmers	and	say:	“Hey,	your	use	of	pesticides	
is	a	mistake!”	Moreover,	 it	 should	come	as	no	surprise	 if	we	are	criticized	as	personifications	of	
egotism	for	racing	back	and	forth	in	search	of	safe	food.…Yet	we	are	given	no	choice	but	to	do	so.	
We	have	no	choice	but	to	pursue	safe	foods,	fully	conscious	of	the	fact	that	our	behavior	has	been	
self-centered.	Such	humility	is	the	only	way	we	can	avoid	the	error	of	succumbing	to	egotism.	We	
need	to	escape	 from	a	world	 in	which	others	are	criticized	and	denounced,	where	people	abuse	
each	other,	and	fight	for	things.…You	want	organic	vegetables,	don’t	you?	I	want	them	too.	Our	
movement	will	stand	at	its	starting	point	for	the	first	time,	when	we	create	a	world	in	which	people	
begin	to	think	about	what	they	can	do	together.45
The	innovative	ways	in	which	Daichi’s	leaders	answered	their	critics	during	the	early	1980s	were	
a	crucial	element	in	helping	the	movement	solidify	its	social	credibility	as	both	a	business	and	an	SMO	
and,	moreover,	 in	 establishing	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 proposal	 generation’s	 strategy.	 By	 1985,	Daichi	
boasted	a	membership	of	3000,	and	after	the	introduction	of	an	individual	home	delivery	system	that	
year,	membership	increased	rapidly,	currently	standing	at	around	50,000.46	To	be	sure,	not	all—or	even	
most—of	these	50,000	members	consider	themselves	citizen	activists.	Most	are	ordinary	people	(mainly	
housewives)	who	join	out	of	a	desire	to	obtain	safe	produce.	Most	are	probably	not	interested	in	laying	
the	basis	for	a	new	civilization.	Yet,	as	Fujita	argues,	Daichi	members,	simply	by	way	of	their	membership,	
tacitly	express	their	consent	with	respect	to	values	that	guide	the	organization’s	operations.	By	becoming	
members	and	by	purchasing	Daichi	produce,	consumers	directly	support	Daichi’s	activist	agenda	and	its	
message	of	proposal.	
4. Conclusion
To	 the	 skeptical	 eye,	Daichi’s	 leaders	may	have	 “commodified”	 a	 set	of	 ideas	better	 left	outside	
the	market	 system.	True	 or	 not,	 there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	 ideas	 themselves—and	 specifically,	 their	
pragmatic	standpoint—appealed	to	target	constituencies,	influenced	members’	behavior,	and	ultimately,	
impacted	on	movement	organization.	When	activists	at	the	center	of	the	proposal	generation	organized	
a	cruise	to	the	Islands	of	Okinawa	in	October	1986,	they	mobilized	over	500	individuals	 from	some	
170	citizens’	movements	around	Japan.	Though	the	official	aim	of	their	cruise	was	to	forge	links	with	
young	organic	banana	farmers	in	the	prefecture—hence	the	tour’s	title,	The Banana Boat Cruise	—	it	
proved	to	be	much	more.	For	the	first	time,	citizen	activists	openly,	and	with	one	voice,	acknowledged	
the	shift	in	grassroots	social	movement	praxis	from	protest	to	proposal.	In	August	of	the	same	year,	the	
high-circulation	progressive	weekly,	the	Asahi Journal,	ran	an	article	titled	“The	New	Wave	of	Lifestyle	
Proposal-style	Citizens’	Movements,”	in	which	it	announced	that	the	Banana	Boat	Cruise	would	be	“the	
very	first	networking	space	for	proposal-style	citizens’	movements	throughout	Japan.”47	The	hype	was	not	
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misplaced.	Together	with	activist	groups	on	the	cruise,	over	1,300	other	groups	registered	their	names	for	
a	networking	list	to	be	published	by	Hon no Ki,	a	small	Tokyo	publishing	house.	As	Hon no Ki’s	owner,	
Shibata	Keizō,	later	recounted,	this	in	itself	was	a	revolutionary	event.	“By	1986,	most	citizen	groups	
weren’t	afraid	 to	put	 such	 information	 in	a	 list,”	Shibata	notes.	“They	were	no	 longer	afraid	 that	 the	
government	would	put	them	on	some	kind	of	hit	list.	There	was	no	risk	in	going	public.”48	For	better	or	
worse,	then,	by	1986	the	citizen	movement	landscape	had	undergone	major	changes,	and	it	was	activists	
themselves	who	had	played	a	central	role	in	effecting	this	change.	And	this	brings	us	full	circle	to	the	
questions	raised	at	the	beginning	of	this	paper.	What	changed	in	citizen	activism	during	this	period,	and	
why?
The	question	of	what	 changed	 is	 obvious.	On	 a	discursive	 level,	 the	 language	used	by	 activists	
underwent	significant	transformation.	“Protest,”	“demonstration,”	“opposition,”	“movement”	and	other	
such	terms	faded	into	the	background,	replaced	now	with	ideas	such	as	symbiosis	(kyōsei),	participation	
(sanka),	activism	(katsudō),	and	of	course,	proposal	 (teian).	Coupled	with	this	discursive	 shift,	citizen	
movement	 strategy	also	underwent	 significant	change.	What	we	might	call	 the	“pragmatism	of	ends”	
came	to	dominate	the	social	movement	sector.	Citizen	activists	began	to	tap	into	and	engage	with	existing	
legal,	economic	and	political	institutions	instead	of	blindly	opposing	them.	When	possible,	they	pursued	
strategies	 to	promote	 financial	 independence	and	professionalization.	Activists	 tended	 to	avoid	broad	
systemic	questions,	 focusing	 instead	on	discrete	 issues.	So,	on	the	 surface,	at	 least,	 the	movements	of	
the	late	1980s	looked	and	felt	a	lot	different	to	their	predecessors	in	the	1960s	and	early	70s.	The	ways	
movements	articulated	their	message	and	the	strategies	they	adopted	spoke	to	a	remarkably	new	praxis	
in	the	social	movement	sector.
The	question	of	why	citizens’	movements	changed	in	the	ways	they	did	is	more	complex.	At	the	
broadest	 institutional	 level,	 there	 is	no	doubt	that	the	conservative	political	and	legal	environment	of	
post	Red	Purge	Japan	played	a	significant	role	in	guiding	activists	away	from	the	confrontational	model	
of	 social	 activism;	we	might	view	 the	1960s	 as	 a	 steep	 learning	curve	 in	 this	 respect.	The	experience	
of	 the	 late	1960s	not	only	 shaped	 the	 realm	of	 the	possible	but,	more	 importantly,	 the	 realm	of	 the	
imaginable,	and	hence	we	must	account	for	the	impact	of	such	institutions	in	shaping	the	playing	field	
for	the	new	movements.	On	a	more	nuts	and	bolts	level,	the	shift	in	activism	also	clearly	benefited	from	
the	fruits	of	growing	affluence	during	the	1960s	and	70s.	Affluence	affected	macrosocial	value	change,	
and	this	produced	mobilizable	constituencies	for	the	movements	of	the	70s	and	80s.	But	more	than	this,	
affluence	and	the	reaction	to	affluence	also	produced	new	opportunities	for	the	activist	community	in	
areas	as	diverse	as	recycling,	aged	care,	and	organic	foods.	In	a	sense,	the	new	issues	raised	by	the	shift	to	
post-industrialization	guided	the	focus	of	the	social	movement	sector.	So	the	availability	of	resources—
constituencies,	 finances	 etc.—also	 helped	 to	 stimulate	 the	 shift	 from	 protest	 to	 proposal.	 Here	 the	
Japanese	experience	mirrored	a	 similar	process	 in	 the	 industrialized	nations	of	 the	West,	where	 social	
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activism	shifted	from	protest	to	more	mainstream	strategies.49
However,	as	 I	have	argued	 throughout	 this	paper,	 the	 transformation	 in	citizen	activism	during	
the	70s	and	80s	was	not	merely	an	epiphenomenon;	nor	can	it	be	explained	entirely	in	structural	terms.	
As	the	case	of	Daichi	reveals,	activists	made	key	decisions	within	the	bounds	of	institutional	limits	and	
available	 resources—decisions	 which	 contributed	 to	 the	 overall	 shift	 in	 the	 social	 movement	 sector.	
Indeed,	 if	we	look	closely	at	the	philosophy	behind	many	of	these	decisions—for	example,	the	desire	
for	movement	autonomy,	political	neutrality,	financial	independence,	or	direct	democracy—we	discover	
that	the	citizen	activists	of	the	70s,	80s	and	beyond,	may	not	have	been	so	different	to	their	forebears	
in	the	“protest”	generation.	Unlike	the	analysis	of	academics,	activists	did	not	take	a	“glass	half	empty”	
approach	to	activism.	In	other	words,	they	did	not	discard	the	earlier	principles	of	citizen	activism	and	
recommence	with	the	question:	“How	do	we	survive	given	the	terribly	constraining	environment?”	Their	
“glass	half	full”	approach	began	with	the	question:	“How	do	we	organize	ourselves	and	accomplish	our	
goals	in	the	way	we	want	to,	given	the	reality	out	there?”	Working	from	this	perspective,	activists	then	
sought	out	ways	to	preserve	their	principles	on	the	basis	of	new	strategies	and	new	discourses.	The	case	
of	Daichi	 is	 instructive	here:	 leaders	did	not	choose	 the	 stock	company	 form	by	default.	They	chose	
it	 because	 the	 single	 share	 idea	 fit	with	 their	philosophy	of	 an	 internally	democratic	 and	 responsible	
movement.	The	ideas	of	activists	were	thus	crucial	factors	in	the	shift	from	protest	to	proposal.	But	we	
should	also	recognize	the	fact	that,	in	many	cases,	the	impulses	informing	these	ideas	resonated	closely	
with	earlier	grassroots	ideology	and	activism	in	Japan.	Activists	certainly	moved	beyond	protest,	but	they	
shared	many	principles	with	the	diehard	protestors	of	old.
So	what	then	of	the	wider	impact	of	the	proposal	generation?	There	are	at	least	four	outcomes	we	
can	 tentatively	 label	positive,	 and	one,	 tentatively	negative.	First,	 through	 a	 combination	of	business	
entrepreneurship	 and	 idealism	 firmly	 rooted	 in	 daily	 life,	 proposal-style	 citizens’	 movements	 helped	
reframe	citizen	activism	as	a	professional	undertaking.	In	stark	contrast	to	the	movements	of	the	1960s,	
activists	challenged	 the	entrenched	beliefs	 that	 indigence	was	proof	of	 sincerity;	 that	 legitimate	 social	
movements	should	be	funded	by	donations;	and	that	profitability	was	somehow	corrupting.	The	extreme	
version	 of	 such	 logic	 was	 that	 only	 profitable	 or	 financially	 self-sustaining	 movements	 are	 socially	
significant.	 For	 most	 activists,	 however,	 the	 primary	 implication	 was	 that	 social	 movements	 could	
legitimately	 and	 ethically	 pursue	profits	 or	 professionalism,	 if	 this	 could	 support	 their	 agenda.	From	
this	 perspective,	 proposal	movements	 represent	 a	 historical	 “missing	 link”	 between	 the	 protest-based	
residents’	and	citizens’	movements	of	the	late	60s	and	early	70s	and	the	NPO	generation	from	the	1990s.
Second,	by	adapting	 to	 the	 realities	of	 legal,	political,	 and	economic	 institutions,	proposal-style	
citizens’	 movements	 forged	 a	 less	 confrontational	 relationship	 with	 traditional	 enemies,	 particularly	


